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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL
LEAGUE: A HISTORICAL AND
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
C. PETER GOPLERUD 111*
I. INTRODUCrION
Collective bargaining in professional sports is a relatively new
concept. It has only been a factor in professional team sports for
approximately the last thirty years. During this short time period, a
turbulent history ensued with the promise of additional controversy
in the future. This article will focus on several aspects of collective
bargaining in the National Football League (NFL). First, it will take
a historical look at the process within the NFL, analyzing the work
stoppages and litigation which have scarred the process over the
last three decades. Particular attention will be paid to the interrela-
tionship between labor law and antitrust law in the sports context
and its possible demise resulting from the recent Supreme Court
ruling in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.1 Second, this article will draw
comparisons to labor relations in the other team sports. Finally,
there will be a discussion of the future issues and concerns of the
NFL.
II. HISTORY
A. The Early Days
To gain a thorough appreciation of the current issues within
the collective bargaining context of the NFL, it is important to un-
derstand some history. It is interesting to observe that as this article
is being written, the NFL is perhaps the most stable of all profes-
sional sports leagues in terms of labor disputes. This is somewhat
surprising given the recent history of the league, which will be
chronicled below. Throughout the history of professional football
there has almost always been labor unrest of sorts. This unrest has
come in the form of both individual grievances and group discord.
* Dean and Professor of Law, Drake University Law School. BA., J.D., Uni-
versity of Kansas.
1. 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 124-35.
A more thorough and probing analysis of the case and its implications can be
found in Robert McCormick, Labor or Antitrust? Let the Players Choose, 4 Vii..
SPORTS & Err. L.J. 38 (1997).
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During the early years, Red Grange resorted to hiring an agent to
negotiate a contract for him and changed teams as a result.2 More
recently, fledgling leagues have arisen, at least in part, because of
unhappiness of players with working conditions.3 During and fol-
lowing every sports labor dispute within the last twenty years, the
media and the public have contended that this particular labor
problem would be the impetus to a break down of professional foot-
ball, baseball, basketball or hockey. Suffice it to say all four sports
are still alive and apparently doing rather well, albeit not without
problems.
The National Football League Players Association (NFLPA)
was first formed in 1956, but it was not recognized until two years
later when passing reference was made to the union in congres-
sional testimony by Commissioner Bert Bell.4 Despite the existence
and some recognition of the association, there was not actually a
collective bargaining agreement between the players and owners
until 1968.5 At approximately this same time, professional baseball
and basketball were beginning to organize. 6 Despite the existence
and recognition of players associations, none were particularly
strong nor well accepted by management. Finally, in 1969, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) indicated that it would ac-
cept jurisdiction over professional sports.7
It is important to understand that basic federal labor policy fa-
vors, where appropriate, organized efforts at collective bargaining
for terms and conditions of employment. 8 It supports collective
bargaining over individual bargaining as a measure of attaining a
2. See ROBERT H. RUXIN, AN ATHETE's GUIDE To AGENTS 3 (1989).
3. See ROBERT C. BERRY ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 92-
96 (1986);JJOHN C. WiESTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORT §6.01 (1979).
4. See BERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 96.
5. The National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) was formally
recognized by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) as a labor organization,
within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1994), and as the exclusive bargaining
representative of all National Football League (NFL) players, within the meaning
of 29 U.S.C. § 159 (a) (1994). See Robert C. Berry, Collective Bargaining in Professional
Sports, LAw OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS §4.01(2) (Gary A. Uberstine,
ed., 1995).
6. See id.
7. See WESTART & LOWELL, supra note 3, at 778.
8. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994). The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) en-
courages "the practice and procedure of collective bargaining." Id. It gives em-
ployees the right to organize for collective bargaining purposes. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1994). It also gives employers the equivalent right to form multi-employer
bargaining units, such as the NFL. See National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45
F.3d 684, 688 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that relevant legal authority strongly suggests
that employers are not prohibited from acting jointly in bargaining with union).
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balance of power between the employer and the employee. Labor
policy mandates that the two sides engage in "good faith" bargain-
ing with regard to "mandatory" subjects of bargaining. 9 It does not,
however, mandate a particular result from this bargaining. These
policies provide economic pressure mechanisms for both sides to
the collective bargaining, mechanisms which have indeed been
used by both sides in the case of the NFL.10
Labor law as applied to professional sports presents some
unique characteristics. A typical professional athlete is not the typi-
cal worker in the context of a labor issue. Clearly, the average sal-
ary of a professional football player separates him from the auto
worker or the teamster. So too does the very public nature of the
business. Very few workers, aside from professional athletes, have
detailed accounts of their on the job performances replayed on tel-
evision networks or in the print media on a daily or weekly basis.
The workers in professional football also have extremely short ca-
reers, averaging four to five years.'1 Thus, unlike most other union
situations, the composition of the union rank and file is constantly
changing.' 2 There are also several classes of athletes within the
union: superstar, rookie, journeyman player and role player. It is a
multi-employer bargaining unit, with each team having a player
representative to the union. In addition, beyond league minimum
salaries and other basic conditions of employment, individual con-
tract negotiations occur within the context of a collective bargain-
ing unit.
Management is also a unique group in professional sports, and
the NFL is no exception. Typically, management consists of ex-
tremely wealthy individuals or groups of individuals with a minimal
knowledge of the game or its history and culture. In many situa-
tions the franchise has been purchased not as the individual's sole
business, but as more of a novelty item. Many NFL owners are here
today and gone tomorrow, often with large profits. Some today are
quite nomadic. Recent moves or threatened moves by the Rams,
Raiders, Browns, Oilers and Seahawks are evidence of this trend.
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994). Employers and employees are required "to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment." Id.
10. Once a bargaining representative has been chosen for the employees and
the employer unit is selected there is a "soup to nuts array of rules and remedies"
provided under the NLRA. Williams, 45 F.3d at 693. See also Caldwell v. American
Basketball Ass'n, 66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that NLRB has obligation to
enforce collective bargaining agreements).
11. See BERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 15.
12. See id. at 15.
19971
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The make-up of the NFL has proven to be a formula for labor tur-
moil and rancor.
The early period of the NFLPA did witness some work stop-
pages and labor unrest. In the late 1960s there was a dispute over
pension contributions which management was to have made and
did not.' 3 A brief work stoppage occurred during training camp in
1968, again centering on the issue of pension contributions, and it
was quickly resolved. 14 In the early 1970s the players walked out of
training camp again, this time over post season compensation and
grievance procedures. This produced a three day strike by the play-
ers, and in turn a seventeen day lockout by management.15
B. The 1974 Strike and Litigation
The first major strike in professional sports occurred in 1974 in
the NFL.16 It was a catastrophic failure. The strike lasted forty-four
days and left the union badly split and seriously underfunded. 17
The key focus of the strike was the Rozelle Rule pertaining to player
free agency. 18 The rule allowed a player to change teams at the
conclusion of his contract if he could negotiate a new deal with a
new club; however, the new club was required to compensate the
old club for the loss of the player. 19 Adequate compensation in the
form of players or cash was to be negotiated between the two
teams. 20 If the teams could not reach an agreement, the compensa-
tion was to be set by the Commissioner of the NFL, Pete Rozelle. 21
There were no guidelines for awarding compensation and, ulti-
mately, there was very little player movement. The apparent
purpose of the rule was to discourage player movement. Indeed,
Rozelle himself said that if players were given total freedom to ne-
gotiate their services, the league would be dominated by a few rich
teams and would eventually lose both fan interest and revenue.22
13. See id. at 97.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See BERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 97.
17. See id. The strike failed due to negative player sentiment and lack of soli-
darity. See id.
18. See id. at 125. The strike also involved the easing of curfews and other
disciplinary rules imposed on players by management.
19. See id.
20. See id. Thus, the players lacked control during the negotiations in fixing
their approximate worth. See id.
21. See BERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 125.
22. See id. (quoting Kennedy, Star-Struck Canton, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 5,
1974, at 12).
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At the same time that the bargaining process was at work re-
garding, among other items, the Rozelle Rule, there was also litiga-
tion actively challenging the validity of the rule under the Sherman
Antitrust Act.23 This was the beginning of the interrelationship be-
tween the antitrust laws and the labor laws in the context of
employer-employee relations in professional sports. Nearly two de-
cades earlier the Supreme Court had made it clear in Radovich v.
NFL24 that all professional sports, except baseball, were subject to
the antitrust laws. This sort of pronouncement was necessary only
because of the existence of the aberrational cases of Federal Baseball
Club v. National League2 5 and Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.26
These cases had established that professional baseball was exempt
from the antitrust laws on grounds unique to the times and to the
treatment of the sport by Congress and the American public.27
The first significant litigation focusing on the NFL collective
bargaining process was Mackey v. NFL,28 in which the Eighth Circuit
was called upon to evaluate the validity of the Rozelle Rule. Such
evaluation was necessary because of the failure of the bargaining
process and the strike to effectively represerit the players' interests,
thus leaving the antitrust laws as the only vehicle for challenging
the owners' actions. The basic complaint of the players was that the
Rozelle Rule amounted to an "illegal combination and conspiracy
in restraint of trade denying professional football players the right
to freely contract for their services." 29 The district court had found
a per se violation of the Sherman Act in the form of a group boy-
cott, and in the alternative, determined that even using the rule of
23. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (challenging NFL rule
allowing league commissioner to require team acquiring free agent to compensate
player's former team).
24. 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (holding that volume of interstate business in profes-
sional football requires control of antitrust laws).
25. 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (stating that baseball exhibitions are purely intrastate
and not interstate affairs that fall outside scope of antitrust laws).
26. 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (following precedent that baseball is exempt from
federal antitrust laws as state affair).
27. This paper is not the appropriate forum to discuss, analyze, and lambast
the trilogy of baseball opinions of Federal Baseball, supra note 25, Toolson, supra note
26, and Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). Others have done this quite well in
different settings. Suffice it to say the author is in extreme disagreement with the
historical and current treatment of baseball under the antitrust laws. It is equally
clear, as noted in the text, that other professional sports and amateur sports are
subject to the coverage of the Sherman Act. See also Haywood v. National Basket-
ball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971); United States v. International Boxing Club, 348
U.S. 236 (1955). The extent of that applicability is somewhat lessened by the re-
cent decision in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., discussed infra notes 122-33.
28. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
29. Id. at 609.
1997]
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reason the Rozelle Rule violated the Sherman Act.30 It rejected the
clubs' arguments that the rule was necessary to promote competi-
tion and that it was immune from attack because it was part of a
collective bargaining agreement. 3 1 The district court entered an in-
junction against the league prohibiting enforcement of the rule.3 2
On appeal the Eighth Circuit was faced with two issues: does
the so-called labor exemption from antitrust laws protect the Ro-
zelle Rule from attack; if not, does the rule violate the Sherman
Act? The court began its review of the case by noting that, prior to
1963, players were free to move to another team following the expi-
ration of their contracts, with no compensation paid to the original
team. 33 This policy was changed in 1963 when the Baltimore Colts
the signed R.C. Owens, a star receiver formerly with the San Fran-
cisco 49ers. 3 4 The new policy, essentially the Rozelle Rule, was uni-
laterally adopted by the member clubs of the NFL.3 5 The apparent
purpose of the rule was to maintain competitive balance among the
NFL teams and protect the clubs' investments in scouting, selecting
and developing players.3 6
In Mackey, the league attempted to claim the protection of the
nonstatutory exemption by arguing that the Rozelle Rule emanated
from the collective bargaining agreement. The labor exemption
from the antitrust laws takes two forms, one statutorily created and
the other judicially developed. Various provisions of the Clayton
Act3 7 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act 38 state that labor unions are not
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, and specifically
declare that certain types of union activities, such as secondary pick-
eting and group boycotts do not violate the Sherman Act.39 The
30. See id.
31. See id. For a definition of the rule of reason, see infra note 54 and accom-
panying text.
32. See id. The owners also attacked the District Court's findings of fact. See
id.
33. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610. The court also noted that the NFL's opera-
tions had been unilaterally controlled by the owners. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id. The Rozelle Rule was adopted as an amendment to the NFL's con-
stitution and by-laws. See id.
36. See id. at 611. It is worthy of note that during the period between the
adoption of the rule and the 1974 work stoppage over the validity of the rule, 176
players played out their options (the end point of the standard contract). See id.
Thirty-four signed with other teams. See id. In three cases the clubs waived com-
pensation; in 27 cases the clubs mutually agreed upon compensation; and in four
cases the Commissioner awarded compensation. See id.
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1994).
38. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 104-105, 113 (1994).
39. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 611 (8th Cir. 1976).
[Vol. 4: p. 13
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basic premise was to protect reasonable, collective activities by em-
ployees from the terms of the Sherman Act which might otherwise
prohibit the normal activities of a labor union.4 0 This protection is
consistent with a strong congressional policy favoring the collective
and organized efforts of employees to deal with issues of wages and
working conditions.4 1
The statutory exemption, however, does not cover agreements
between unions and non-labor organizations or groups. The Su-
preme Court filled in this gap by holding "that in order to properly
accommodate the congressional policy favoring free competition in
business markets with the congressional policy favoring collective
bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act . . . certain
union-employer agreements must be accorded a limited nonstatu-
tory exemption from antitrust sanctions."42
In Mackey, the court initially assessed the various factors to be
considered in applying the nonstatutory exemption to a particular
case. Essentially, the analysis is whether the relevant federal labor
policy is deserving of pre-eminence over the federal antitrust policy
given the particular circumstances of the case at hand. Three fac-
tors must be present for the labor exemption to apply: 1) the re-
straint on trade must primarily effect only the parties to the
collective bargaining agreement; 2) the agreement sought to be
protected must concern a mandatory subject of collective bargain-
ing; and 3) the agreement sought to be protected must be the prod-
uct of bona fide arm's length bargaining. 43
Next, the court traced the history of the Rozelle Rule in the
labor context. The rule was initially included in the league consti-
tution and by-laws by unilateral action of the member clubs. In
1968 it was incorporated by reference in the collective bargaining
agreement.44 There was no hard evidence of extensive bargaining
or negotiating over the rule during the process leading to the 1968
40. See id; see e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100,
421 U.S. 616 (1975); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
41. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 612.
42. Id. (citing Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421
U.S. 616 (1975); Local Union No. 189, Almagamated Meat Cutters and Butcher
Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965)).
43. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614. The player claimed that the Rozelle Rule was
the product of unilateral action on behalf of the owners and that there was no
exception available. See id.
44. See id. at 615.
1997]
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agreement.45 There was trial testimony that this may have been due
to the weak nature of the union. Prior to the new collective bar-
gaining agreement in 1970, there was little discussion of the rule. 46
Finally, there was extensive discussion over the issue and still no
agreement during the 1974 negotiations. 47
The court applied the three part test for the nonstatutory labor
exemption to this case and first found that the Rozelle Rule clearly
affected only the parties to the agreement.48 The court then deter-
mined that while the rule did not directly deal with a mandatory
subject of bargaining (wages, hours and other terms and conditions
of employment), it did have a definite impact on wages and thus
the second part of the test was satisfied.49 In looking at the third
prong of the test, the existence of good faith arm's length bargain-
ing on the issue, the court agreed with the district court that the
Rozelle Rule did not stem from such bargaining.50 It found a rela-
tively weak union upon which an onerous rule had been unilater-
ally imposed. The court found neither direct nor indirect benefits
for the players under the rule. Accordingly, the court found that
the nonstatutory labor exemption did not apply and continued on
to analyze the antitrust issues raised by the players association. 51
The court easily found that the players raised a valid antitrust
question and that "restraints on competition within the market for
players' services fall within the ambit of the Sherman Act."52 It then
turned to the merits of the claims themselves. The court declined
to follow the district court's ruling that the group boycott in this
case constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Act. It found
that the unusual circumstances surrounding a professional sports
league built upon restrictions aimed at promoting competition
made this setting inappropriate for use of the per se rule.53
45. See id. at 612. The court noted that the players did not seek elimination of
the rule but rather maintained that it should be modified. See id. During negotia-
tions, there was little discussion of the Rozelle Rule. See id.
46. See id. at 612. The only reference to the rule was that the NFLPA was
"disturbed" by the negative consequences of the Rozelle Rule. Id.
47. See id. at 613. The court stated that "[t]he NFLPA and the Clubs have




50. See id. at 616.
51. See id. The court held "we need not decide whether the effect of an agree-
ment extends beyond its formal expiration date for purposes of the labor exemp-
tion." Id. n.18.
52. Id. at 618.
53. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 617.
[Vol. 4: p. 13
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The court proceeded to review the district court's holding that
the Rozelle Rule also amounted to a violation under the rule of
reason analysis. The court noted that the basic inquiry is "whether
the restraint imposed is justified by legitimate business purposes,
and is no more restrictive than necessary."5 4 The court first consid-
ered the district court's findings regarding the nature of the re-
straint. It agreed with the lower court that the rule:
Significantly deters clubs from negotiating with and sign-
ing free agents; that it acts as a substantial deterrent to
players playing out their options and becoming free
agents; that it significantly decreases players' bargaining
power in contract negotiations; that players are thus de-
nied the right to sell their services in a free and open mar-
ket; that as a result, the salaries paid by each club are
lower than if competitive bidding were allowed to prevail;
and that absent the Rozelle Rule, there would be in-
creased movement in interstate commerce of players from
one club to another.55
The NFL's attempts to justify the restraints imposed by the rule
were rejected by the Eighth Circuit. It found no support for the
contention that players would flock to cities having natural advan-
tages such as "larger economic bases, winning teams, warmer cli-
mates and greater media opportunities."56 It further determined
that competitive balance would not be adversely impacted by strik-
ing down the rule and that continuity of team rosters was not a
legitimate concern as it related to competitive balance. The court
declined to hold that any system of restraints on player movement
would violate the Sherman Act, but did clearly hold that the Rozelle
Rule was "significantly more restrictive than necessary to serve any
legitimate purpose. "5 7
54. Id. at 620 (citing Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231
(1918); Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard Inc., 485 F.2d 119
(8th Cir. 1973)).
55. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620.
56. Id. at 621.
57. Id. at 622. For a contrasting approach to the application of the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption, see McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th
Cir. 1979).
In McCout, the Sixth Circuit applied the principles set forth in Mackey with
regard to the labor exemption with a different result. See McCourt, 600 F.2d 1193.
It specifically found that the union had bargained at length with determination on
the issues in question and that the bargaining was in good faith at arms length. See
id. This ruling was made despite the general perception that the union and man-
1997]
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Two other cases were litigated at approximately the same time
and are historically significant for both labor and antitrust pur-
poses. The first case, Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,58 involved a chal-
lenge to the validity of the college football draft conducted by the
NFLA.9 While this was primarily an antitrust case arising outside of
the collective bargaining process, it did once again raise the issue of
the relationship of labor law with antitrust law. The draft first ap-
peared in 1935 and provided a system of allocation of college play-
ers. 60 An attempt at balance was maintained by awarding selections
to teams in reverse order of the finish in the league standings the
previous year.61 In 1968, when Smith was drafted, the process con-
sisted of sixteen rounds in which all twenty-six NFL teams partici-
pated. Once drafted, if a college player could not reach agreement
on a contract with the team that selected him, he could not play for
any other team in the league. 62 Smith challenged this process as a
violation of the Sherman Act.
The NFL initially claimed the draft was immune from chal-
lenge because it was protected by the labor exemption. The district
court held that the exemption was inapplicable because the draft
did not become part of the collective bargaining agreement until
several months after Smith was selected.63 The circuit court found
the per se rule did not apply to the antitrust claims but nonetheless
found that the draft was anticompetitive under the rule of reason.
The draft was found to violate the Sherman Act because the league
could not convince the court that the pro-competitive aspects of the
process outweighed the anticompetitive aspects. 64
The other relevant case concerning an antitrust issue was Kapp
v. NFL.65 Kapp, a quarterback in the latter stages of a career that
began in the Canadian Football League and later flourished in the
NFL,66 brought suit challenging the Rozelle Rule, the draft rule,
the anti-tampering rule and the rule requiring the use of the stan-
dard form contract. All of the rules were challenged as violations of
agement occupied a particularly friendly relationship. See BERRY ET AL., supra note
3, at 207.
58. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
59. See id.
60. See id. at 1175.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 1176.
63. See Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 741-44 (D.D.C. 1976),
affd in part and rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
64. See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1187.
65. 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
66. See id. at 75.
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the Sherman Act. The court's main focus on a motion for summary
judgment was the standard form contract. The league attempted to
defend the standard form contract on the basis of the labor exemp-
tion, but the court correctly noted that it was not a part of the col-
lective bargaining agreement until several months after the claim
arose. 67 The court ultimately entered summary judgment in favor
of Kapp.
Thus, with the holding in Mackey and the related cases 68 the
players finally had free agency at their fingertips. They proceeded
to bargain it away, however, as the new collective bargaining agree-
ment took shape in 1977. Instead of unfettered free agency, the
two sides agreed to a system whereby a right of first refusal was cou-
pled with compensation for players lost to another team.69 The
compensation scheme continued to operate as a significant deter-
rent to wholesale movement of players. The compensation came in
the form of draft choices and was based upon the salary of the
player who was attempting to change teams.70 The compensation
could be as high as two first round draft choices. 71 As a result, only
six players actually changed teams under the 1977 collective bar-
gaining agreement. 72 In return for this system, the players ob-
tained the league's agreement to a closed shop and automatic dues
checkoff to insure the stability of an unstable budget situation for
the union. There were also improvements to the pension program
and changes with regard to the Commissioner's role in the griev-
ance system. 73 This agreement was probably the beginning of the
end for Ed Garvey, the Executive Director of the NFLPA, for the
settlement was described as "the biggest sellout by a union in sports
history."74 It was a deal which in hindsight looks outrageous, but in
the context of the time may not have been so disastrous.
67. See id. at 86.
68. See e.g., Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978) (discussing damages
phase of Rozelle Rule challenge).
69. See BERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 127.
70. See id.
71. See id. Compensation in the form of two number-one draft choices in
successive years was the amount required for the acquisition of players not earning
more than $129,000. See id.
72. See id.
73. See DAVID HARRs, THE LEAGUE: Tm RISE AND DECLINE OF THE NFL 304
(1986).
74. Id. at 305. Of course, since the entire history of unions in sports was
barely a decade in length, this statement may not be so meaningful. See id.
1997]
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C. The 1982 Strike and Agreement
Once again in 1982, as the 1977 collective bargaining agree-
ment was coming to a close, the relationship between the owners
and the NFLPA was somewhat acrimonious and the threat of a
strike loomed as training camp opened that summer. Both sides
anticipated a strike and were better prepared financially to deal
with one than in previous years. 75 After months of relatively fruit-
less negotiations, the players went on strike on September 21, 1982,
following a Monday night game. 76
There were several key issues dividing both sides. The most
publicized was a demand by the players that the owners set aside
fifty-five percent of their gross revenues for the players.77 The own-
ers responded that such a concept was "alien to American busi-
ness."78 Following a failure to agree on this point the players
attempted to gain acceptance of a wage scale based on years of ex-
perience. Such a scale assumed a certain amount of revenue would
be available for salaries. 7 9 The owners were opposed to this con-
cept as well, expressing concern that the system would provide no
incentive for quality performance and it would leave the league ripe
for player raids from another league, such as the United States
Football League (USFL).80
The other issue which simply would not go away, as much as
both sides tried to make it, was free agency. The owners remained
opposed to free agency, mindful of what they saw as destructive
consequences of the concept in baseball and basketball.8 ' As the
strike continued so did negotiations to resolve these issues. The
players staged a brief series of all-star games during the strike, but
75. See BERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 128. It is important to note that at the
time these negotiations were occurring a new rival league was getting underway
with its operations. See id. The United States Football League was to announce its
spring format and begin the acquisition of players. See id. There were also intense
negotiations underway for a new television contract for the NFL. See HARRIs, supra
note 73, at 625-29.
76. See BERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 137.
77. See id. at 131.
78. HARRIs, supra note 73, at 644. A major portion of the media coverage for
the negotiations and strike focused on two key personalities: Ed Garvey of the
NFLPA and Jack Donlan, the chief negotiator for the NFL Management Council.
See id. This period also witnessed the emergence of Gene Upshaw, then the Presi-
dent of the NFLPA, as a key figure. See id. He would later succeed Garvey as
Executive Director. See id. The owners viewed Garvey as the villain. See id. The
strike was described as "Ed Garvey's strike" and it was said that "when Mr. Ed Gar-
vey wants a settlement... you'll have a settlement." Id. at 642.
79. See BERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 133.
80. See id. at 134.
81. See id.
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abandoned the series following poor attendance and threats of liti-
gation.82 The strike finally ended in November, fifty-seven days af-
ter it began, when the two sides agreed to a new collective
bargaining agreement.
The new agreement did not include free agency, but rather it
merely fine tuned the right of first refusal system. It did include
minimum salaries escalating with seniority for the players and a
guarantee of the right of the players to use agents. There was also a
payment of so-called "money now" bonuses for ending the strike. 83
The college draft was continued through 1992 and there was some
severance pay for veterans. Most observers concluded that the own-
ers "won" the strike.8 4 Certainly it was the swan song for Ed Garvey,
for he left the union the following year and was replaced as Execu-
tive Director by Gene Upshaw, who still serves in that position
today.85
The period between 1982 and 1987 was at once tranquil and
volatile. The relationship between the league and the NFLPA was
relatively calm. The instability resulted when the USFL owners
tried to sign key players from the NFL for enormous salaries. 86 The
litigation with the USFL and that league's subsequent demise also
kept the players and the owners busy on a variety of fronts.87
A case which should be noted because of its analysis with re-
gard to the three part test for application of the labor exemption is
Zimmerman v. NFL.88 The case did not stem from a formalized col-
lective bargaining process at the conclusion of an agreement, but
rather from an issue arising from the collapse of the USFL. The
NFL had to decide how to handle entry or re-entry into the league
of those players formerly in the USFL. Following some brief discus-
sions between union and management, it was decided that a re-en-
try draft would be held shortly after the annual collegiate draft.
The plaintiff in this case, a star offensive lineman in the USFL, chal-
lenged his draft by the New York Giants on the grounds that he was
not part of the bargaining unit, and even if he was, the process
violated the Sherman Act. The court disagreed, finding that the
draft was exempt under the labor exemption. 89 The court so held
82. See id.
83. See HARMS, supra note 73, at 648-49.
84. See BERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 145, Table 5-6.
85. See id. at 148.
86. See id.
87. See United States Football League v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988).
88. 632 F. Supp. 398 (D.D.C. 1986).
89. See id. at 406.
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despite the fact that the policy regarding the re-entry draft was not
embedded in a collective bargaining agreement. It said:
The labor exemption is based on the policies underlying
the labor laws, but the validity of an agreement under
those laws is a separate question from the applicability of
the labor exemption. Further, to qualify for the exemp-
tion, the understanding between the parties need not be
contained in a formal collective bargaining agreement.90
With regard to the particular issues raised by Zimmerman in
this case the court noted that the union and the owners had negoti-
ated at length on the issue. It appeared to the court that the union
had decided that "it was in the best interest of the membership to
agree to the draft based on the concessions received from the
NFL."91 The court further stated:
It is not the Court's function in the context of the labor
exemption to evaluate the relative bargaining prowess and
strategy of the parties, to determine who secured the bet-
ter deal or whether there was adequate consideration ex-
changed. The important question is whether bona fide
bargaining took place such that the policies in favor of
such bargaining should take precedence over antitrust
concerns.
92
D. The 1987 Strike and Litigation, ad nauseum
In 1987 the stage was set once again for discord between the
union and the league. This time around it quickly became clear
90. Id. at 404.
91. Id. at 406. The court analyzed in great detail the nature of the negotia-
tions, the strengths and weaknesses of both sides in this case and then compared
them to the situations in previous cases involving the NFL and NFLPA. See id. It
determined the two sides were on a much more level playing field in this case than
in Mackey, Smith, or Kapp. See id. at 406-07.
92. Id. at 408. The court stated with regard to the case at hand:
Because the owners gave up something they were already prepared to
grant does not mean that there was an absence of bargaining or that it
was conducted in bad faith. In fact, that the union was convinced that
roster size was a significant issue over which they needed to bargain is
evidence of the arm's-length relationship between the parties. Similarly,
the Court is convinced that the union felt the various agreements it en-
tered into were in its best interest. It is the union's honest, albeit subjec-
tive, perception that is relevant to the existence of good faith bargaining
rather than the Court's objective determination of the comparative value
of the consideration exchanged.
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that there was only one issue of significance - FREE AGENCY.
Following unsuccessful negotiations, the players once again went
on strike early in the 1987 season. The strike lasted for four games,
before the players capitulated somewhat and called an end to the
work stoppage. During this strike the owners brought in "replace-
ment players" for the four games and attempted to put up the ap-
pearance of continuing a normal playing season. The end of the
strike did not signal an end to the negotiations or the strife. Indeed
it was simply the beginning of nearly six years of negotiation and
even more litigation.
In Powell v. NFL,93 the primary focus of litigation was the labor
exemption. 94 The players mainly contended that virtually all action
by the owners relating to wages and working conditions following
the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement amounted to
violations of the antitrust laws. The players' complaint sought to
enjoin the teams from continuing to abide by the expired 1982
agreement, particularly those terms relating to free agency and
player movement. 95 Specifically, they sought a ruling that the labor
exemption had expired and no longer protected the owners. The
district court initially declined to rule on the matter, preferring to
wait for a ruling from the NLRB regarding claims by the league that
the players were not bargaining in good faith. 96 The NLRB did sub-
sequently rule there had been good faith efforts to bargain and that
impasse had formally occurred. The district court held in the
union's favor, ruling that the exemption expired when the two
sides to the labor dispute reached impasse.97
The Eighth Circuit, however took a different view of the issue.
The circuit court held that the nonstatutory labor exemption pro-
tected the league even though the collective bargaining had ex-
pired and impasse had occurred.98 The court concluded that this
93. 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
94. See id.
95. See id. at 1296.
96. See Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 789 (D. Minn. 1988). The district
court held "[biecause a finding of good faith must be made as a precondition to
determining impasse, the Court must await the NLRB's 'good faith' determina-
tion." Id.
97. See id. The district court, however, declined to rule on the question of
whether impasse had actually occurred here, preferring to wait for the NLRB's
determination as to whether the players had failed to bargain in good faith. See id.
When the NLRB subsequently ruled in the players' favor, the district court then
granted summaryjudgment to the players, finding that impasse had occurred. See
id. This decision was appealed to the Eighth Circuit. See Powell v. National Foot-
ball League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
98. See Powell 930 F.2d at 1293.
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holding was necessary in order to give proper accord to federal la-
bor policies. Specifically, it appeared that the court was concerned
that without the application of the nonstatutory labor exemption,
the players would have an effective weapon otherwise unavailable to
them through the collective bargaining process. The court be-
lieved that by using "impasse" as the point at which the exemption
terminates the players would have an added incentive to speed to-
ward impasse, a practice contrary to the notion of good faith bar-
gaining. It was also concerned that impasse is often a temporary
status, used for strategic purposes.99
The court further noted that following the expiration of an
agreement the labor laws provide a variety of avenues to work out
differences. Among other things, as noted above, there is a contin-
uing obligation to bargain in good faith. 100 Prior to impasse the
employer is obligated to maintain the status quo as to wages and
working conditions. Following impasse, the employer may imple-
ment new or different terms so long as they were reasonably con-
templated during the bargaining sessions. 101 The court indicated
that not every action by an employer is shielded from the antitrust
laws, but it gave little guidance as to what might be subject to the
Sherman Act. The court also failed to indicate at what point in
negotiations or a bargaining relationship the labor exemption
would terminate. At bottom, the court seemed quite concerned
about maintaining stable labor policy. It did not want to do any-
thing to disturb the level playing field. To emphasize this position
the court said:
The labor arena is one with well established rules which
are intended to foster negotiated settlements rather than
intervention by the courts. The League and the Players
accepted this "level playing field" as the basis for their
often tempestuous relationship, and we believe that there
is substantial justification for requiring the parties to con-
tinue to fight on it, so that bargaining and the exertion of
economic force may be used to bring about legitimate
compromise. 102
99. See id. at 1299 (quoting Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB,
454 U.S. 404 (1982)).
100. See id. at 1300.
101. See id. at 1301.
102. Id. at 1303.
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just as football fields themselves are not level, however, the
playing field between the NFL and its players has never been level.
Even though the union has strengthened, professional sports un-
ions remain unique among unions. As noted earlier, the turnover
among players within the union is much higher than among em-
ployees in other industries. During that time, job security is almost
totally lacking in football, due to the rarity of guaranteed contracts.
As noted by one commentator, "[u]nlike industrial employees, pro-
fessional athletes do not possess homogeneous skills; a wide range
of ability and expertise exists among players. Not surprisingly, dif-
ferent union demands affect superstars and marginal players
differently."1 0 3
It is also clear that the NFL is a relatively strong multi-employer
unit. A jury has found it to possess monopoly power. 10 4 The play-
ers have extremely unique skills which do not transfer to another
industry. There is only limited alternative opportunity for transfer
offered by the Canadian Football League, the World League of
American Football and the Arena Football League. All three fail to
provide a high level competition like the -NFL. Both the Powell
court and later the Supreme Court in Brown show a significant lack
of understanding of the unique nature of professional sports. Care-
ful treatment of the industry in both the labor and antitrust areas is
merited, but it is usually overlooked by the courts as demonstrated
by these two cases.
Following the Eighth Circuit's decision in Powell, the only
course of action left for the union in view of the stalemate in bar-
gaining was to decertify as a bargaining unit. This course had been
hinted at by the majority and grudgingly suggested by the dissent in
Powel. 105 This is exactly what the union proceeded to do.
The NFLPA continued to exist, but more as a trade association
with no bargaining authority. The players disavowed the union's
authority to act as their bargaining unit and subsequently sought
103. Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989
DuKE L.J. 339, 354. Professor Lock's article, which has been widely quoted by
courts facing these issues, goes on to note:
Because of the brief work-life of its bargaining unit employees, the union
has an extremely short institutional memory. The NFLPA experiences
approximately twenty-five percent yearly turnover in its bargaining unit, a
rate unheard of in industrial unions.... [T] he brief work-life guarantees
that few players will remain in the League long enough to benefit from
the elimination of certain restraints.
Id. at 355-56.
104. See United States Football League v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335, 1341 (2d Cir.
1988).
105. See Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293, 1310 (8th Cir. 1989).
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the court's endorsement of this action as well as a ruling that the
nonstatutory labor exemption had ended. The court ruled favora-
bly on the players' motion for summary judgment on the issue of
the termination of the labor exemption.10 6 The court found that
the NFLPA was no longer engaged in any collective bargaining and
was not representing players in grievances. It also found that the
players had paid a price for the decertification of the union in that
the League had unilaterally, without notice, changed insurance
benefits and lengthened the playing season. The court held that
no formal decertification proceeding before the NLRB was neces-
sary to bring down the curtain on the union.10 7 It also held that
with the demise of the union as a bargaining unit, the nonstatutory
labor exemption was no longer available and the players' antitrust
action could proceed on the merits.10 8
In McNeil v. NFL,109 the players prevailed on a special verdict:
the Right of First Refusal/Compensation Rules in Plan B did have a
substantially harmful effect of competition in the relevant market
for the services of professional football players. 110 The jury con-
cluded that the rules were more restrictive than reasonably neces-
sary to achieve the objective of establishing or maintaining
competitive balance in the NFL."' Finally, the jury found that the
rules caused economic harm to the plaintiffs. 112
Shortly after the verdict was handed down in McNeil, White v.
NFL, 1 3 a class action covering the remaining issues and additional
players, was initiated. Ultimately the district court approved a set-
tlement of the case.114 Approximately one week later, the NFLPA
and the NFL entered into a new collective bargaining agreement
which contained all of the terms of the settlement in White. The
class action settlement was then modified to reflect the additional
procedural and organizational matters included within the collec-
tive bargaining agreement.115
106. See Powell v. NFL, 764 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn. 1991).
107. See id. at 1358.
108. See id. at 1359.
109. Civil No. 4-90-476, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21561, at *1 (D. Minn. 1992).
110. See id. at * 1.
ill. See id.
112. See id.
113. White v. National Football League, 836 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Minn. 1993),
affd 41 F.3d 402 (8th Cir. 1994).
114. White, 836 F. Supp. 1458.
115. See id. There were several prominent players who challenged the settle-
ment and agreement in this litigation. See id. There was also a challenge from one
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The key elements of this new agreement included the free
agency sought by the players for over two decades. The deal of-
fered unrestricted free agency to players who had completed five
years of service in the league and restricted free agency to players
with three years of service. 1 6 The agreement included a salary cap,
which was intended to be a "hard cap," but has not proven to be
so.1 17 The cap is set at sixty-two percent of projected designated
gross revenues of the league, divided by the number of the teams in
the league (thirty).' 18 The agreement also required that the league
pay out a minimum of fifty-eight percent of designated gross reve-
nues in salaries and that each team pay a minimum of fifty percent
of its designated gross revenues in salaries.'1 9 Today each team is
allowed to protect one "franchise" player who would otherwise be
eligible for free agency, but they must pay him the average of the
top five salaried players at his position. 120 In addition, a portion of
the salary pool is set aside for first year players, and the agreement
sets a maximum to be paid to draft choices. Further, if the entire
rookie pool is not used, it is available for signing of veteran play-
owner, but the court upheld and approved the settlement and collective bargain-
ing agreement. See id.
Another event in labor relations occurred at the end of the 1993 season when
a majority of the members of the Washington Redskins refused to pay their union
dues. National Football League Players Association v. Pro-Football, Inc., 857 F.
Supp. 71 (D.D.C. 1994), aff'd 79 F.3d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The NFLPA re-
quested that the team suspend the players as required by the collective bargaining
agreement. See id. The team refused, claiming it would violate Virginia labor laws
if it did so. See id. The NFLPA sought an injunction, but was thwarted when the
district court found that the team was actually located in Virginia and thus the law
of that state, not the District of Columbia, governed. See id.
At one point in the protracted labor rift, the League even went so far as to file
an antitrust case against a number of high profile agents, asserting that the sharing
of salary information amounted to price fixing. The Five Smiths v. National Foot-
ball League Players Association, 788 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Minn. 1992). The case was
dismissed, however, by the district court. See id.
116. See Will McDonough, Finally, NFL Makes a Dea BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 7,
1993 at 37. Under the deal, teams could retain restricted free agents by matching
offers received by the players. See id.
117. Numerous teams have discovered methods of structuring contracts
which circumvent the intent of the cap and make it more flexible. The most com-
mon tactic is to pay large signing bonuses which are prorated for cap purposes
over the life of the contract and set base salaries quite low. This approach is likely
to cause some teams financial problems which will require them to release high
salaried veteran players during these latter years of the agreement. The agreement
now is slated to end in 2001.
118. See Collective Bargaining Agreement Between NFL Management Council
and NFL Players Association, Art. XXIV, § 4 (on file with author).
119. See id. at Art. XXIV, §§ 3, 5.
120. See id. at Art. XX, §§ 1, 2.
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ers. 121 The agreement also included improvements to the pension
plan and damages to the players. 122 Finally, the college draft was
reduced to seven rounds, plus one round for compensating teams
that lose free agents.1 23
The one remaining piece from the last round of bargaining
and litigation was the developmental squad case, Brown v. Pro-Foot-
ball, Inc.124 This case stemmed from the NFL's unilateral imposi-
tion of a salary scale for players on the developmental squads
during the height of negotiations. 125 The players challenged this as
price fixing, and the League predictably claimed that the labor ex-
emption protected it from antitrust claims.1 2 6 The district court
held in favor of the players and ultimately entered a damages
award. 12 7 The court of appeals reversed and the case has now con-
cluded with the first significant antitrust loss for the players.1 28
The Supreme Court handed down its decision in the case on
June 20, 1996.129 In an eight to one decision, the Court upheld the
circuit court's decision, effectively eliminating the antitrust avenue
for the players within the context of the labor world. 130 The
Supreme Court did not interpret the labor exemption as broadly as
had the court of appeals. The Court placed heavy emphasis on the
importance of labor harmony and the national policy favoring free
and private collective bargaining. The Court indicated it was simply
carrying out what it saw as the preference of Congress to curtail
judicial use of the antitrust laws to resolve labor disputes.13 1 In
looking at the question of what the appropriate course should be
following impasse, the Court believed that the antitrust laws con-
fused the issue, creating a dilemma for employers. If employers im-
pose terms similar to their last offer, then antitrust charges will
appear. If they impose some other terms, unfair labor charges will
follow. The Court found this to be untenable, doubting that "non-
121. See id. at Art. XVII.
122. See McDonough, supra note 116.
123. See id.
124. 116 S. CL 2116 (1996).




129. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2116.
130. See id. at 2119.
131. See id. at 2120.
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expert antitrust judges" would be capable of dealing with such la-
bor problems.13 2
The Court also refused to end the exemption at the point of
impasse. It stated, "[1] abor law permits employers, after impasse, to
engage in considerable joint behavior," including joint lockouts
and replacement hiring. 133 It also noted that impasse is often tem-
porary, merely a ploy in the general course of bargaining by the
various sides, or a blip on the screen of a long bargaining process.
It could well occur several times during the course of negotiation of
a collective bargaining agreement.
The Court further refused to label professional sports as some
sort of special category of industry for labor and antitrust analysis.
It said:
We also concede that football players often have special
individual talents, and, unlike many unionized workers,
they often negotiate their pay individually with their em-
ployers.... But this characteristic seems simply a feature,
like so many others, that might give employees (or em-
ployers) more (or less) bargaining power, that might lead
some (or all) of them to favor a particular kind of bargain-
ing, or that might lead to certain demands at the bargain-
ing table. We do not see how it could make a critical legal
difference in determining the underlying framework in
which bargaining is to take place.1 34
The Court's decision will require the players in all professional
sports to take a new approach to labor relations.135 Players unions
may have to give significant consideration to decertifying as bar-
gaining agents in times of trouble. The owners still have the only
game in town for team sports because alternative opportunities do
not exist for most of the employees in this industry. Players in foot-
ball, basketball and hockey must now look to baseball's experience
with labor law as the only arena, and this experience has not been a
good one.
132. Id. at 2118. As noted above the courts have not had a great deal of diffi-
culty dealing with labor matters in the past. Courts are faced with issues arising
across a broad spectrum of subject matter on a daily basis in which they are not
"experts." There is nothing unique about labor law in this regard.
133. Id.
134. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2126.
135. See id. The Court clearly indicated that its decision impacted all of pro-
fessional sports and indeed, all of organized labor. See id. It sent a further message
by denying review of National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams. See National Basketball
Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).
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III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND A LOOK TO THE FuTuRE
This article began by noting that, ironically, the NFL is proba-
bly the most stable of the four major professional sports leagues at
the present time. Historically, that has not necessarily been the
case. As the preceding section documents, the NFL has suffered
through numerous work stoppages, unfair labor practice charges
and lawsuits on its way to the present "stability." The National Bas-
ketball Association (NBA), Major League Baseball (MLB) and Na-
tional Hockey League (NHL) have been somewhat more stable,
although not perfectly tranquil.
The past three or four years, however, have shifted the focus
from football to the other three sports due to the somewhat tran-
quil nature of the NFL. The NBA only had one brief work stop-
page: a three month lockout in 1995 which did not interrupt any
regular season games.' 36 It has been in and out of court, but usu-
ally with more productive results than the NFL. The first significant
litigation was Robertson v. National Basketball Association,137 which
stemmed from the players' disagreements with restraints on player
movement. 138 A free agency system resulted from the settlement of
the litigation. The league and the players were scrutinized by the
court for a number of years following this litigation.
In 1983, following protracted negotiations, a new labor agree-
ment produced the first salary cap. It limited what the teams could
spend on player salaries, but committed a guaranteed percentage
of league revenues to the players.' 39 The agreement, particularly
the portion containing the salary cap, has been credited with saving
the NBA from self destruction, because at the time of its inception,
there were several teams on the verge of collapse. 14° After this
136. See Tim Povtak, No Lockout-and No Signings; A Deal to Accept the NBA's
Collective Bargaining Agreement Puts Off Free-Agent Signings Until July 9, ORLANDO SEN-
TINEL, June 29, 1996, at C1 (containing history of labor relations in NBA since
salary cap was instituted in 1983).
137. 72 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affid, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977).
138. See id. Prior to this case the NBA had unsuccessfully litigated the restric-
tions on player eligibility for the draft prior to the completion of their collegiate
eligibility. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal.
1971).
139. See BERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 181-83. This cap has been characterized
as a "soft cap," meaning it can, and has been, manipulated because of countless
exceptions which were incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement. See
id.
140. See MARTINJ. GREENBERG, SPORTS LAW PRACTICE 210-12 (1993). It is also
interesting to note that at about this same time, 1984 to be exact, David Stem
became Commissioner of the NBA. His tenure as Commissioner, until the last 12
months, has been marked with prosperity and relatively stable labor relations.
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agreement was reached, the league enjoyed about ten years of pros-
perity and tranquillity, continuing through a collective bargaining
agreement which expired with the conclusion of the 1993-94 sea-
son. Negotiations began on a new contract and only as this article
is going to print has the NBA finalized its collective bargaining
agreement; something everyone thought was completed twelve
months ago.' 4 1 The league does have a strong and relatively well
respected commissioner in David Stern. Personalities have played a
role in the history of the players association, particularly that of the
late Larry Fleisher. The key personalities at this point appear to be
several of the prominent player agents. The future will reveal what
the results of the latest series of events in the NBA will be.
Major League Baseball continues to be a badjoke. Baseball, of
course, enjoys its antitrust exemption and thus has been relatively
free of litigation. That is not to say it has enjoyed labor peace.
There have been numerous strikes and lockouts over the last twenty
years and the league and players' association have spent much of
their time before the NLRB. 142 The players were able to obtain free
agency in 1975 through an arbitrator's decision. 143 As with the
other sports there has been a significant increase in player salaries
and a corresponding decrease in franchise values. The gains the
players have made over the years may be attributed to a lack of
unity among the owners. This may also explain in part why there
has not been a labor agreement for three years. Negotiations have
been on and off since the disastrous strike in the summer of 1994.
141. The two sides agreed to a no strike-no lockout position for the 1994-95
season in order to work on a new agreement. Unfortunately this failed to produce
a new collective bargaining agreement. During this time the Executive Director of
the players association resigned under pressure and agents for several superstars
began to be a significant influence on the negotiations. Indeed, several of the
players led a move to decertify the union which went to a formal vote of the players
in the summer of 1995. Prior to this the league had announced a lockout, sus-
pending all league operations and player transactions. The decertification vote
failed and a tentative agreement was reached and ultimately approved in Septem-
ber of 1995. All that remained, supposedly, was to work out details in the
language.
This final fine tuning has taken ten months. See Povtak, supra note 134. All
the while the players and the league have continued to litigate the labor exemp-
tion question in Wiliams. This was ultimately settled by the Brown case. Brown v.
Pro Football Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996).
142. See BERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 59-74.
143. See Kansas City Royals v. Major League Baseball Players Association, 532
F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976) (upholding arbitrator's decision effectively eliminating re-
serve clause in standard baseball contract, thus opening door to free agency at end
of contract). The free agency concept was subsequently locked into baseball
through the 1976 collective bargaining agreement. See id. Contrary to predictions
at the time it has not caused the demise of the game.
1997]
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As this article goes to press there are rumors that a settlement is
near.
14 4
Baseball has not had a commissioner since 1992, and as a
result, has been unable to make major decisions. Again, rumors
indicate that once a labor agreement is reached, then a concerted
search for a commissioner will commence. Leadership is badly
needed in order for the owners to put up a united front. Some
critics on the outside have also been calling for the resigna-
tion of Don Fehr, the Executive Director of the Players Association,
although he, like his predecessor Marvin Miller, is a strong leader
who has provided continuity and consistency during his tenure.
The NHL and its players association have been experiencing
difficulties as well. Only recently has the NHL entered the world of
work stoppages and unfair labor practice charges. This is partly
due to the fact that the enormous strength of management has
faded in the last decade.' 45 The National Hockey League Players
Association was formed in 1957, but did not really become any kind
of a factor until 1967.146 During the 1970s and 1980s, the players'
association was led by Alan Eagleson who was liked by the players,
but was viewed by others as far too close to management. In addi-
tion, in a classic conflict of interest, he represented individual play-
ers in contract negotiations. Ultimately, he was indicted on fraud
and racketeering charges and replaced as Executive Director by
Bob Goodenow, who has taken a much tougher approach to rela-
tions between the union and management.147
During the early 1990s, the NHL has enjoyed unprecedented
success. It almost lost all of this momentum, however, as a result of
a disastrous lockout during the first half of the 1994-95 season.
Most of the problems have been worked out and the league is now
enjoying the benefits of a lucrative television contract. Expansion
discussions are underway as well. Comparatively, the NHL is the
closest professional league to the NFL in terms of stability. The
NHL has the opportunity to be the boom sport of the decade, but
must remain quiet on the labor front to do so.
144. See SPORTS INDUSTRY NEws, July 5, 1996, at 262.
145. See BERRY ET AL., supra note 3, at 206. During the 1950s and early 1960s
there were only six teams in the league. See id. Two of them were owned by the
same family and this same family also controlled the arena of a third team. See id.
146. See id.
147. See Michael Farber, Man on a Mission: Russ Conway's Investigative Work
May Bring Down a Hockey Power Broker, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 19, 1996, at R1;
Joe LaPointe, Union Offer Creates Little Stir by Owners, N.Y. TimEs, Nov. 12, 1994, at
34.
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COLLECrIVE BARGAINING IN THE NFL
It is uncertain as to what lies ahead for the NFL. Franchise free
agency, the almost whimsical movement of franchises from city to
city, has major labor implications. Licensing also has labor impact.
The future of the salary cap and the current shape of the collective
bargaining agreement have enormous ramifications. The 1993 col-
lective bargaining agreement eliminated the middle class, but has
worked much better than many of the players had originally
thought. What happens with the next television contract will in
large part dictate the parameters of the next collective bargaining
contract. There continue to be pension and safety concerns. The
most critical thing for both management and labor to understand is
that they share related needs and concerns. They must work to-
gether to put their product on the field. They benefit from each
other and need each other. They must not let corporate concerns,
individual greed or any other outside factors destroy the tradition
and integrity of the game. This responsibility lies equally with the
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